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Queen Alice and  
the Monstrous Child:  
Alice Through the Looking-Glass 
by Veronica Schanoes 
 
In Chapter 10 of Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, the 
Unicorn, who had been battling the Lion for the crown of the White King, catches sight of Alice 
and regards her “with an air of the deepest disgust.”  When informed, with great to-do, that she is 
a child, the Unicorn is very excited, exclaiming “I always thought they were fabulous monsters!”  
It is even more fascinated upon being informed that “It [Alice] can talk,” and when addressed, 
Alice good-naturedly says that she had always thought that unicorns were fabulous monsters 
(175). Despite this momentarily mutual recognition of monstrosity, it is Alice who is referred to 
as “the Monster” and addressed as “Monster” by both the Unicorn and the Lion for the rest of the 
chapter. In this sequel to Carroll's wildly successful Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, the 
dream-child has become a monster. Despite pages full of gryphons, mock turtles, and 
bloodthirsty queens, this is the only use of the word “monster” in either Alice book. 
 But why? On the face of it, the Alice of Looking-Glass is far less monstrous than the 
Alice of Wonderland, as Nina Auerbach noted nearly forty years ago. Wonderland Alice's size 
and shape changes at an alarming rate and with an alarming elasticity; Looking-Glass Alice 
maintains her physical self admirably well. Wonderland Alice threatens the inhabitants of the 
fantastical realm through which she travels both accidentally, when she speaks repeatedly and 
longingly of her cat Dinah, who would love to gobble down the creatures Alice encounters, and 
purposefully, when she warns the White Rabbit not to set fire to his own house in order to rid it 
of her overlarge presence; Looking-Glass Alice is unfailingly helpful, and even deferential, to 
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those she encounters, biting down on some of her thoughts to avoid “hurting the poor Queen's 
feelings” (although she does threaten to pick a few unruly flowers at the very beginning of the 
story and destroy her banquet at the end) (196).  
 I would suggest that Alice’s monstrosity in Looking-Glass is key to understanding some 
of the sharp differences between this book and its predecessor, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 
Carroll had established the question of Alice’s identity as central to Wonderland, as she wonders 
if she is curly-haired Ada or possibly the ignorant and deprived Mabel, the rabbit mistakes her 
for his housemaid and succeeds in interpolating her into that role, and she is told there is no 
difference between her and a serpent. I have in a previous article discussed what it means for 
there to be no difference between a little girl and a serpent; here I wish to understand what it 
means for a child to be a monster, to Carroll, to his contemporary readers, and to us. I will 
demonstrate that Alice’s ascension to queendom, the central quest of Looking-Glass, is intimately 
tied to the monstrosity of childhood, and that rather than the book being an indictment of Alice’s 
royal ambition to maturity, becoming a queen is Alice’s path out of monstrosity.  
 What is that monstrosity, then? One path we might follow to discover the answer is an 
etymological exploration of the phrase “fabulous monster.”  “Fabulous” seems clear enough; 
certainly both the unicorn and the character of Alice are creatures of fable. But then again, for the 
unicorn, it is not Alice personally or even little girls generally who are fabulous monsters. It is 
the category of children. In what way, then, are children creatures of fable and monstrous? 
Turning to the entry for “monster” in the stalwart Oxford English Dictionary, we find definition 
A.1.a.: “Originally: a mythical creature which is part animal and part human, or combines 
elements of two or more animal forms, and is frequently of great size and ferocious appearance. 
Later, more generally: any imaginary creature that is large, ugly, and frightening.”  It is 
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interesting that Alice calls the unicorn a fabulous monster, rather than a mythical beast or animal, 
as unicorns are not generally considered monstrous in folklore and fantasy, and it suggests that 
Carroll specifically means to call on the negative connotations signified here. Indeed, even when 
the term “monster” does indicate “an astonishing or unnatural degree of excellence,” according 
to the OED, it does so negatively, as in the 1682 example when the Duke of Buckingham adjures 
young writers to “reject that vulgar error which appears So fair, of making perfect 
characters….you’l draw A faultless Monster….”  Not only negativity is associated with 
monstrosity, but specifically unnatural, inhuman negativity, as demonstrated in definitions A.2. 
and A.5, which in part read, respectively, “Something extraordinary or unnatural” and “A person 
of repulsively unnatural character, or exhibiting such extreme cruelty or wickedness as to appear 
inhuman.”  So children, and unicorns, we find, are ugly and frightening, inhuman and unnatural.1 
 We need not stop with an etymological exploration of monstrosity. Recent years have 
seen theoretical explorations of what it means to be a monster in various contexts, led in part by 
Jeffrey Jerome Cohen. While monster theory is as tied to its historical moment as any other 
theoretical discourse, still a reading of Cohen’s theses combined with a historically situated 
account of the meaning of monstrosity in the nineteenth century offer great insight into Alice’s—
and other children’s—monstrosity. 
 In surveying Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's theses on monster culture, it is tempting to go with 
                                                 
1  I think in this context, we can dispense with “large,” as children in general are not. If this 
word had been used to describe Alice in Wonderland rather than Looking-Glass, “large” might 
have been in play, but Alice’s size is remarkably stable throughout Looking-Glass. It is the chess 
pieces that seem to have grown big. 
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the easy explanation: the monster both stands in for and polices unacceptable sexualities and 
figures the transgression of otherwise unbreachable borders. Charles Dodgson's deep and 
disturbing affection for little girls is the stuff of not-particularly-accurate-or-imaginative pop 
culture “knowledge,” and who could represent transgression better than the desired little girl who 
passes through a mirror? But not only does such an explanation strike me as facile and 
unsatisfying, more importantly, it seems to say far more about our preoccupations than about 
either Dodgson's or his contemporaries'. 
 I hope to demonstrate that for Carroll, Looking-Glass Alice's monstrosity lay in her status 
as an uneasy combination of the ever more distant child-friend on whom she had been based and 
his own authorial imagination, as he strove to compensate for not only an ever-more-distant 
child, but an ever-more-distant childhood. Looking-Glass’s Alice becomes monstrous in her 
unattainable innocence and idealized kindness; the very innocence that Carroll invokes distorts 
Alice into a monster, suggesting that while the figure of the child imagined by the adult may be a 
monster, it is the adult’s imagination that is truly monstrous. 
 It is all too common for readers to conflate Alice's Adventures in Wonderland with 
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, thinking of them as one extended tale 
about Alice's various adventures. Indeed, they are often bound together in one volume (movies 
generally mix and match elements from both books). But of course the situations with respect to 
their writing were radically different. Wonderland was conceived of originally as an ex tempore 
story told to Alice and her two sisters on one of many afternoons Dodgson spent in their 
company, and it was written down at the urging of the then-ten-year-old Alice. It saw print three 
years later—and by that time, there had been some kind of falling-out between the Liddell family 
and Dodgson (due to pages having been cut out of his rather extensive diary, we still do not 
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know the cause2) (Cohen Lewis Carroll 100). Through the Looking-Glass seems to have been 
composed between 1866 and 1871, when it was published. By then, Alice was nineteen years 
old, and it had been eight years since Dodgson and she had been on close terms. In other words, 
while Dodgson had, of course, scores of other child-friends, it had been quite some time since he 
had last spent time with Alice Liddell, and it had become quite impossible to spend time with the 
child Alice.  
The personal situation was quite different, and so are the two books, with Wonderland 
being a rather anarchic, episodic nightmare while Looking-Glass is a more orderly chess-game. 
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There is built around a central quest, Alice’s 
journey across the world of the chessboard to become a queen. Alice loses her name and her 
memory temporarily on this journey, and much of the novel reflects Dodgson’s own horror of 
aging (“You’re beginning to fade, you know,” the Rose tells her in the garden of live flowers 
(123), and when Alice tells Humpty Dumpty that “one ca’n’t help getting older, he responds that 
“One ca’n’t, perhaps,…but two can.  With proper assistance, you might have left off at 
seven”(162)). Carroll makes this clearer nowhere than in the prefatory poem to Looking-Glass, in 
which he figures Alice’s adult life as a “hereafter” to her childhood, thus equating it with death. 
But Alice herself sees her ascension as a very desirable rite of passage. Thus, the girl who barely 
escaped from Wonderland with her identity intact assumes the heavy crown of authority when 
she ventures beyond the looking-glass. 
                                                 
2  The “cut pages in diary document” found by Karoline Leach asserts that the cause of the 
breach was that Lorina Liddell, Alice’s older sister, had expressed romantic feelings for 
Dodgson, and her parents wished to nip such a development in the bud, but as the document’s 
origin and trustworthiness are uncertain, it is an inconclusive piece of evidence. 
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 Despite these differences between the novels’ structures—an episodic picaresque as 
opposed to a plotted journey with a goal—they do share a a certain strong ambivalence regarding 
their authorship, or, as Marah Gubar argues in Artful Dodgers: Reconceiving the Golden Age of 
Children's Literature, Dodgson's desire for a true collaboration between adult and child, 
combined with the fear that no such equal partnership is impossible. Wonderland opens with a 
prefatory poem portraying the story's origin not in Dodgson's imagination alone, but arising from 
among the questions, demands, and interruptions of all three Liddell girls—the “Cruel Three” 
whose “three tongues together” determine the course of the story despite the teller's fatigue. In 
the prefatory poem to Wonderland, Carroll’s account of the origin of the story is one of fatigue 
and bossy little girls: “Yet what can one poor voice avail / Against three tongues together? / 
Imperious Prima flashes forth / Her edict 'to begin it': / In gentler tones Secunda hopes / 'There 
will be nonsense in it!' / While Tertia interrupts the tale / Not more than once a minute” (3). We 
are then treated to an example of this dynamic when the Dormouse—there are some indications 
that, like the Dodo, he is a figure for Dodgson3—attempts to tell a story at the Mad Tea Party. 
These are the circumstances under which the original Alice story was created, according to 
Carroll, and he emphasizes the point further by Alice’s behavior during the Dormouse’s attempt 
to tell a story:  
“Once upon a time there were three little sisters,” the Dormouse 
began in a great hurry; “and their names were Elsie, Lacie, and 
                                                 
3  Like the Dodo, the Dormouse’s name begins with “Do,” the first sound of Dodgson’s 
name, and as an adult, Alice Hargreaves, nee Liddell, remembers Dodgson pretending to fall 
asleep in the middle of telling a story to his child-friends in order to tease them (quoted in Cohen 
Lewis Carroll 91). 
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Tillie; and they lived at the bottom of a well—“ 
“What did they live on?” said Alice, who always took a 
great interest in questions of eating and drinking. 
“They lived on treacle,” said the Dormouse, after thinking a 
minute or two. 
“They couldn’t have done that, you know,” Alice gently 
remarked. “They’d have been ill.” 
“So they were,” said the Dormouse; “very ill” (58-59). 
Alice goes on to interrupt the Dormouse at least four or five more times, her interruptions 
determining the information the Dormouse provides and thus the course of his story. In a very 
real way, Alice and the Dormouse create the story together, and tellingly, it is a story about little 
girls. Again, what is at stake is the question of who gets to write the narrative of childhood, who 
gets to construct childhood and child-characters.  
 But the scene described in the opening poem to Wonderland has changed 
dramatically by the end of Looking-Glass. In the ending poem to Looking-Glass, the origin tale 
is refigured so that the three girls are far more idealized—not to mention quieter: “Children three 
that nestle near, / Eager eye and willing ear, / Pleased a simple tale to hear” (209). In this 
idealized, sanitized version of the story’s origin, Alice and her sisters have become a silent, 
innocent audience. When writing childhood is left to adults, we run the risk of making child-
characters into monsters of sentimentality and nostalgia.The question with which the narrative of  
Looking-Glass closes asks whether the entire story had been Alice's dream or that of the Red 
King...such a binary division, of course, ignores the possibility of a joint dream, the collaborative 
partnership so strongly desired in the prefatory poem to Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, and 
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suggested throughout that narrative by passages in which Alice considers that she ought to be the 
subject of a fairy tale, and that “when I’m grown-up, I’ll write one” (29). There is a similar 
gesture toward joint authorship in Looking-Glass when, just after Alice passes through the 
mirror, she finds the various chess pieces struggling on the floor where they have fallen. Invisible 
to the pieces, she moves the White King to the top of a table, and he decides to make a note of 
the experience:  
Alice looked on with great interest as the King took an enormous 
memorandum-book out of his pocket, and began writing. A sudden 
thought struck her, and she took hold of the end of the pencil, 
which came some way over his shoulder, and began writing for 
him. 
The poor King looked puzzled and unhappy, and struggled 
with the pencil for some time without saying anything; but Alice 
was too strong for him, and at last he panted out “My dear!  I really 
must get a thinner pencil. I ca’n’t manage this one a bit: it writes 
all manner of things that I don’t intend—” (115) 
The King’s interrupted struggle with the attempt to write his feelings is hijacked by 
Alice’s interest in describing the adventures of the White Knight (“The White Knight is sliding 
down the poker. He balances very badly” (116)) While the struggle over the pencil may seem 
more adversarial than collaborative, it is not unlike the interactions Carroll describes between 
himself as the tale-teller and Alice and Edith Liddell as the collaborative audience in the 
prefatory poem to Wonderland: “In gentler tones Secunda hopes / ‘There will be nonsense in it!’ / 
While Tertia interrupts the tale / Not more than once a minute.”    
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Alice’s seemingly adversarial authorial relationship with the White King creates the text 
in his memorandum-book. Given that what Alice is writing is a description of the White Knight, 
her writing is particularly suggestive in light of The White Knight’s identification with Carroll 
himself. Is Carroll writing Alice, or is Alice writing Carroll? Or is this scene, in which Alice 
overpowers a king, a foreshadowing of her ascension to a queenhood of her own by the end of 
the novel? If monsters, as Jeffrey Jerome Cohen suggests, are monstrous in part because of their 
refusal to remain confined in orderly categories, the author who is jointly adult and child, unable 
to be only or wholly one or the other because the author is actually both, becomes inherently 
monstrous. But there are notably fewer fantasies of authorial collaboration in Looking-Glass than 
there are in Wonderland, and I would suggest that this change reflects the distancing of the figure 
of Alice the character. The collaborative chaos of Wonderland has become the orderly lesson of a 
chess-game, and corrrespondingly, aggressive, angry Alice becomes a sanitized innocent. 
 The desire for an adult-child collaboration has not changed, as indicated by the incident 
with the White King's memorandum book cited above, but the character of Alice herself has, as 
Nina Auerbach pointed out in her landmark essay “Alice: a Curious Child.”   Compared to her 
Wonderland sister, Looking-Glass Alice is relatively meek and mild, resignedly putting up with 
the annoying antics of the creatures around her so as not to offend them (in Wonderland, of 
course, she had no such scruples). The very openings of the two books demonstrate a difference 
in Alice’s character. Wonderland Alice is feeling bored, and within a few sentences we are in the 
thick of her adventures as she chases the White Rabbit. Looking-Glass Alice spends some pages 
in a sort of precious, saccharine monologue to the black kitten, saying things like “you little 
mischievous darling!” and “I wonder if the snow loves the trees and fields, that it kisses them so 
gently? And then it covers them up snug, you know, with a white quilt; and perhaps it says ‘Go 
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to sleep, darlings, till the summer comes again’” (108, 109)  The word “darling” is not to be 
found in Wonderland, but here Alice uses it twice in a few pages. Another interesting difference 
between the two books is in their use of nonsense poetry. Wonderland’s Alice is the source of 
almost all the nonsense poetry in that text, with the exception of the Lobster Quadrille and 
Beautiful Soup, underscoring her status as collaborator and author, and a good deal of her poetry 
is threatening, such as “How Doth the Little Crocodile.”  But Looking-Glass Alice is almost 
always the audience, and a polite audience she is, often stifling her impatience and boredom (the 
very emotion that led her into adventure in Wonderland), as in her response to the White 
Knight’s offer of song (“‘Oh, that’s the name of the song, is it?’ Alice said, trying to feel 
interested” (186)) or Humpty-Dumpty’s poetry: 
“As to poetry, you know,” said Humpty-Dumpty, stretching out 
one of his great hands, “I can repeat poetry as well as other folk, if 
it comes to that—” 
“Oh, it needn’t come to that!” Alice hastily said, hoping to 
keep him from beginning. 
“The piece I’m going to repeat,” he went on without 
noticing her remark, “was written entirely for your amusement.” 
Alice felt that in that case she really ought to listen to it; so 
she sat down, and said “Thank you” rather sadly…(166) 
Alice not only succumbs to a sense of obligation when it comes to listening to nonsense in 
Looking-Glass, in contrast to her abrupt departures from the mad tea party and the caterpillar in 
Wonderland when they tried her patience, but she demonstrates respect and kindness to the 
Queens, helping to dress the somewhat pathetic White Queen and obeying the Red Queen when 
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first she meets her in the garden:  
“Where do you come from?” said the Red Queen. “And where are 
you going? Look up, speak nicely, and don’t twiddle your fingers 
all the time.” 
Alice attended to all these directions…(124). 
Not only does Alice attend to all those directions, but she calls the Queen “your Majesty” as 
requested, and when the Queen contradicts her, Alice “didn’t dare to argue the point.”  This is in 
contrast to Alice’s attitude and behavior toward the Queen of Hearts in Wonderland, where she 
decides not to follow the gardeners’ lead in literally kowtowing to the Queen. While she is 
initially polite, she answers the Queen’s question about who the gardeners are by saying “How 
should I know?...It’s no business of mine.”  When the Queen takes in the situation and orders 
that the gardeners be beheaded, Alice actually interrupts her by saying “Nonsense!” “very loudly 
and decidedly” (64).  Her relationship to the animals in Wonderland is bound up with issues of 
predator and prey (“Do cats eat bats?” she wonders as she falls down the rabbit hole. “Do bats 
eat cats?” (9)). She terrorizes the mouse and assorted birds she meets in the pool of tears with 
tales of her cat Dinah, but in Looking-Glass, her behavior toward animals is kind and courteous, 
as she wanders companionably through the forest where things lose their names with her arms 
around the fawn’s neck (the fawn does run off when it recognizes Alice as a human child, but 
Alice herself makes no threatening move) and obeys the lion and unicorn’s commands.  
Auerbach ascribes this difference to Dodgson's distance from the real Alice. The 
prefatory poem to Looking-Glass would tend to support this reading, as Carroll refers to himself 
and Alice being “half a life asunder,” and asserts that he is the farthest thing from her mind: “No 
thought of me shall find a place / In thy young life’s hereafter” (103). That “hereafter” is not an 
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isolated incident—the poem is rife with allusions to Alice’s death and ghostliness: “Come, 
hearken then, ere voice of dread, / With bitter tidings laden, / shall summon to unwelcome bed / 
A melancholy maiden!” (103). While early death was not at all uncommon (indeed, Alice’s sister 
Edith perished at the age of twenty-two just a few years after the publication of Looking-Glass), 
Alice was alive and well. Yet the final poem of Looking-Glass refers to her “haunting” Carroll, 
“phantomwise” (209). Despite her continued life, for Dodgson, Alice had passed beyond the veil 
and become someone it was possible to idealize, as we so often construct hagiographies of the 
dead.  
 It is this very distance from what Auerbach terms “the real Alice” that positions Looking-
Glass Alice as a monster. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen notes in his “Monster Culture: Seven Theses” 
that the monster's habitation is always “at the margins of the world (a purely conceptual locus 
rather than a geographic one),” that “the monster is an incorporation of the Outside, the 
Beyond—of all those loci that are rhetorically placed as distant and distinct, but originate within” 
(6, 7). I would argue that the past, in relation to the present, certainly qualifies as being placed 
rhetorically as distant and distinct, but of course, it originates in, or as, the present. If we consider 
childhood as the past to an adult present, that relationship is even more striking, particularly in an 
age that was struggling to set childhood apart from adulthood both ideologically and legally in 
ways that it had not previously been, through, for example, child labor laws. It is the very 
distance that transforms Alice from a threatening, rude, and thoughtless little girl to a dream-
child courteous to all, “gentle as a fawn, loving as a dog,” as Carroll put it in his rather sappy 
“Alice on the Stage,” which also makes her a monster. And as a monster, of course, she is 
ungraspable, “Never seen by waking eyes,” as Dodgson puts it in the concluding poem (209). 
Thus Dodgson finds himself in the position of many a seeker after monsters, for, as Cohen's 
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second thesis has it, “the monster always escapes....Monstrous interpretation is as much process 
as epiphany, a work that must content itself with fragments [such as]...talismans, shadows, 
obscured glimpses, signifiers of monstrous passing that stand in for the monstrous body itself)” 
(5-6). It was Otto Rank who observed that shadows and mirror-reflections are merely alternate 
forms of each other, and surely the dream is the obscured glimpse, the signifier of monstrous 
passing sine qua non.  
 As Alice and Dodgson's own childhood, the loss of which he was already writing about 
regretfully at the age of twenty-one4, both receded into the past, the fictional Alice, Looking-
Glass Alice, is left to represent the Other that is the child in Victorian England. While Cohen 
notes that “the monster dwells at the gates of difference,” he focuses his discussion on racial, 
sexual, gendered, and religious difference. But what about the difference inherent in the group of 
people we categorize as children? Do adults not project onto them what we need or want to see 
as well? 
 Certainly, the idealization of children and childhood “innocence,” which continues into 
the present day, is one version of that projection, as adults imagine[d] children to be imbued with 
an innocence and divinity, a connection to the godhead and to nature impossible for an adult in 
his/her fallen state to grasp. As J.M. Barrie puts it, “We too have been there; we can still hear the 
sound of the surf, though we shall land no more” (8). We may be able to sense the innocence that 
is childhood, but we cannot attain it.  
 So too is the idea, which I would also term an idealization, of the child as wild, 
ungraspable Other that Jacqueline Rose constructs in Peter Pan, or, the Impossibility of 
                                                 
4  In a poem called “Solitude,” he wrote “I'd give all wealth that years have piled, / The 
slow result of Life's decay, / To be once more a little child, / For one bright summer-day.” 
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Children’s Literature, an adult projection of difference. The notion that adults, each of whom has 
once been a child, are so wholly incapable of accurately remembering or understanding children 
that children’s literature becomes an impossibility is absolutely dependent on an assumption, or 
rather, a projection, of utter and absolute difference, as well as a fantasy of a being who is not 
always already written by and writing into the social/cultural/symbolic order. Just as adults who 
know their own corruption wished for children to carry the light of innocence and thus redeem 
humanity, Rose’s fantasy of a human being interacting with other human beings who is still 
untouched by (and who does not touch) the symbolic order and its socio-cultural weight is a 
fantasy that sacrifices children’s humanity in order to have them stand for an adult fantasy of 
untouched difference. Marah Gubar’s eloquent rebuttal to and critique of this notion in Artful 
Dodgers posits that Golden Age authors understood children as canny interlocutors, socialized 
beings who use the symbolic order and the cultural products directed at them as much as they are 
used by them. Wonderland’s Alice may be just such a child-character, but Looking-Glass Alice 
has succumbed to hagiography.  
 Thus Looking-Glass Alice's monstrosity lies in her ambiguous reality status—she is a 
representation of Carroll's most beloved child-friend—or is she? Is she a figure onto whom an 
exoticized ideal of difference-as-innocence has been projected, despite Dodgson's own desires 
for a collaborator willful enough to refuse to be the White Knight's prisoner, to battle the Red 
King for ownership of a dream, and to seize the pencil from the White King, to write rather than 
be written? If so, Looking-Glass Alice becomes, then, an example of the monstrosity of the Cult 
of the Child, which sacrificed children's humanity for the sake of their innocence, a 
representative of the monstrous adult imagination. 
 But what about the larger Victorian context? What could Looking-Glass Alice's 
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monstrosity possibly have meant when set within the larger currents of contemporary thought 
about monsters? Hannah Lee-Six and Abigail Thompson trace out a cultural shift in thought 
about the relationship between physical and moral monstrosity marked in the beginning by Mary 
Shelley's Frankenstein and culminating at the fin-de-siecle with Robert Louis Stevenson's The 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Grey. They 
write that  
 
by the end of the century, monstrosity was no longer necessarily 
being viewed as an aberration of nature visited upon the very few, 
but as something residing within apparently normal, respectable, 
and respected individuals....all these fin-de-siecle 
monsters...collectively pose the question of the extent to which 
monstrosity is containable and concealable. The answer is deeply 
disturbing either way...: if we follow Stevenson's logic 
that...monstrosity is concealed and contained within the normal 
and indeed virtuous, that means we are surrounded by monsters 
who...do not warn us of this by their appearance....On the other 
hand, if we opt for Wilde's hypothesis, the implication is that 
sooner or later the poisonous world turns us all into monsters 
and...we cannot prevent that seeping through our respectable outer 
selves and betraying our darkest secrets to all those we encounter 
through the ravages of age (255).  
Considering these two options, does Alice already contain monstrosity within her, concealed by 
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her kind manners and Tenniel's appealing illustrations? Or is she doomed to become a moral 
monster, corrupted by the evils of life, with those corruptions appearing on her face and body as 
she ages and turning her into a physical monster as well? 
 Either is, of course, possible, but it is telling that one of the many theories advanced in 
Stevenson's book to account for the strange hold the abominable Mr. Hyde seems to have over 
the good Dr. Jekyll is that the former is the latter's illegitimate son—indeed, Jennifer Sattaur uses 
Hyde as the example of the “monstrous child” in her book on representations of childhood at the 
fin-de-siecle5. If Alice already both contains and conceals monstrosity, as did Jekyll, this is 
nothing new to her, or to Carroll, at least. It was, after all, in Wonderland that we found that a 
little girl could also be the Serpent. Alice is the expectant mother to her own monstrosity, 
containing and concealing it, at once undoing Victorian tropes of childhood innocence and 
maternal saintliness. The fable that makes Alice a monster is the narrative of the pure, innocent 
child, a narrative to which Carroll can succumb himself (“child of the pure unclouded brow”), a 
narrative that is fundamentally inhuman and unnatural—perhaps even larger than life.6 
 What makes Looking-Glass Alice a monster is both the uneasy knowledge that she is a 
creation, and that she is misrepresentation of difference, a fictional child in an era that was 
asking its children to do the emotional labor of redeeming us with the power of their innocence, 
as Lisa Makman observes that the cult of childhood innocence demanded in her essay “Child's 
                                                 
5  That relationship is the one emphasized in the BBC's recent miniseries, Jekyll, in which 
Hyde, now updated to be very sexy indeed—as well as murderous, mad, and preternaturally 
powerful—refers to his alter ego as “Daddy.”   
6  “It’s large as life and twice as natural,” the White King says of Alice when introducing 
her to the Unicorn. 
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Work is Child's Play: The Value of George MacDonald's Diamond.”  Hers was a human form 
distorted by projection and desire. It is her very innocence and mildness that make her a monster, 
whereas the monstrous appetites and threats of Wonderland’s Alice mark her only as human, as 
one of us. 
 Is there a way out for Looking-Glass Alice, or is she trapped in monstrous innocence and 
kindness? In Artful Dodgers, Gubar argues that  
Rather than single-mindedly insisting that a firm barrier 
separates—and ought to separate—young from old, Carroll 
frequently blurs this line, characterizing the child not as an 
untouched Other but as a collaborator enmeshed in a complicated 
relationship with the adults who surround her….He hopes that 
children can function as empowered collaborators, but…he fears 
that the power imbalance inherent in the adult-child relationship 
ensures that all adults can offer children is a fraudulent illusion of 
reciprocity (95-96). 
Indeed, Gubar presses home the point that for Carroll, children’s refusal and denial of adult 
wishes is essential to their very selves: Carroll “represents children as social, socialized beings 
whose autonomy is limited to saying no to other people’s stories about them. In this way, Carroll 
conceives of identity itself as a collaborative affair, in that it is inevitably reactive, formed in 
reference to the commands and desires of the community one inhabits” (98). In other words, for 
Alice to successfully form her own autonomous identity, she needs to disagree with and defy the 
wishes of adults—perhaps particularly the adult narrator who wishes that “The magic words 
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shall hold thee fast; / Thou shalt not heed  the raving blast” of adulthood7 (103). 
 Looking-Glass Alice has one ambition, one goal: to become a queen. If we accept 
Gubar’s assessment of Carroll’s texts as self-aware, intelligent, and thoughtful considerations of 
relationships between adults and children, I would suggest that we read Alice’s ambition as that 
defiance and disagreement with the adult narrator. Queenhood, or becoming an adult woman, is 
the route out of monstrosity that Carroll offers Alice. 
 The critical verdict on Alice’s reign is that this sequel to Alice’s Adventures in 
                                                 
7  A significant conversation with respect to this reading occurs towards the end of Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland in the courtroom scene, when the Dormouse, whom we have already 
seen as a figure for Dodgson, tells Alice to stop growing: “‘You’ve no right to grow here,’ said 
the Dormouse. ‘Don’t talk nonsense,’ said Alice more boldly: ‘you know you’re growing too’” 
(88). Alice thus allies her penultimate size-change, her spontaneous growth, with natural growth, 
and stands up to the Dormouse, who stomps off, frustrated. This exchange, then, supports 
Gubar’s contention that children must maintain their autonomy in the face of adult pressure by 
refusing that pressure, even when it comes from a loving and beloved source, and that such 
refusals are the bedrock of the child’s identity, always already socialized and in dialogue with the 
adult world. Too, rather than disconcerting Alice, this final growth emboldens her: she speaks to 
the Dormouse “more boldly,” and in her final exchange with the King of Hearts, she “had grown 
so large in the last few minutes that she wasn’t a bit afraid of interrupting him.”  The text makes 
the connection between Alice’s size and her boldness even more explicit with her final, angry 
dismissal of Wonderland “‘Who cares for you?’ said Alice (she had grown to her full size by this 
time). ‘You’re nothing but a pack of cards!’” (88-89, 97).  
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Wonderland, a book that celebrated Alice’s anger and aggression, utterly condemns her queenly 
ambitions. Laura Mooneyham White argues in her 2007 essay “Domestic Queen, Queenly 
Domestic: Queenly Contradictions in Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass” that the events of 
Through the Looking-Glass indicate that Carroll indicts girls’ ambitions to queenhood, which she 
reads as symbolic of political power and adulthood. She writes that Carroll’s text reflects his 
rejection of the corruption such power would inevitably bring to the purity so many Victorians 
imagined they could locate in prepubescent girls. But in this essay, I am arguing that Carroll’s 
innocent little girl-character is already a monster by virtue of that innocence and, given his 
unusual use of the term “monster,” Carroll is self-aware enough to mark his creation’s 
monstrosity. I would argue that Alice’s experience of queening it are more significant than the 
writer’s or narrator’s wistful nostalgia for the childhood of Alice Liddell, nineteen years old 
when Looking-Glass was published.  
 Prior critics have assumed that when Alice’s perspective differs from the narrator’s and 
the events he constructs around her, we are supposed to understand the narrator to be in the right. 
Adrienne Auslander Munich writes that “Carroll presents a conversation between three 
‘queens’—the Red Queen, the White Queen, and the newly crowned Queen Alice—in Through 
the Looking-Glass (1872). Their conversation reveals that not one of them is capable of 
emmanlinacy [Munich’s word for positive masculinity appropriate to the public sphere but 
inappropriate for a woman; it is, she writes, a counterpart to “effeminacy’]. They are properly 
queens, incapable of rationality” (269). Noting that Carroll’s queens are not rational is, of course, 
accurate; but who in these books is? Irrationality is the rule, not a marker of special incapacity on 
the part of queens. Joanna Tap Pierce argues that “when [Alice] reaches that pinnacle of female 
achievement, she also discovers that it holds no power” (751). But as we shall see in this paper, 
Schanoes  Queen Alice and the Monstrous Child  
 
20 
Alice holds all the power in Looking-Glass world—so much so that when she has had enough, 
she destroys it and renders the Red Queen a harmless if mischievous kitten. Jennifer Geer 
dismisses Alice’s own perspective with the following: “The contrast between her success and the 
coronation feast which literally overturns her triumph only intensifies the sense that maturity is 
no prize at all, but a profound disappointment. Alice herself, who calmly pretends to mother the 
black kitten once she returns to her own drawing room in the final chapter, never quite grasps 
this implication, but it certainly is available to the adult reader” (15). Not only is Geer mistaken 
about the coronation feast (Alice overturns the feast, not the other way round), but I also would 
be very skeptical of a reading that depends on a dismissal of Alice as dense, unobservant, or 
ignorant. Finally, White argues “On almost every page, Through the Looking-Glass illustrates the 
disappointing consequences awaiting the girl who would be queen….Carroll’s moral holds that 
wanting to be queen, or rather ‘queens together,’ is the most absurd sort of quest for a little girl 
like Alice,” and describes queenship as a “hopelessly frustrating role she should never have 
hoped to play, a role that brings out the worst in her character” (113). Note White’s assumption 
that “arrogance, cruelty, and violence,” the traits that she argues queenship brings out in Alice are 
undesirable, despite the fact that they are what enable Alice to break out of worlds that have 
grown intolerable twice. 
 That’s what the critics think. But what does Alice herself think? Alice is unmistakable in 
her desire to be queen. Indeed, even before she gets to Looking-Glass world, we’re told that “She 
had had quite a long argument with her sister only the day before—all because Alice had begun 
with ‘Let’s pretend we’re kings and queens;’ and her sister, who liked being very exact, had 
argued that they couldn’t, because there were only two of them, and Alice had been reduced at 
last to say “Well, you can be one of them then, and I’ll be all the rest” (110). Here we see not 
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only Alice’s ambition to be kings and queens (multiple), a desire fulfilled by her dreaming 
mind’s manifestations of two kings and two queens each, but her desire for a sisterhood of 
royalty, not unlike the one she finally achieves with the Red and White Queens (of course, she 
finds the company of those queens more annoying than anything else, but such is often the way 
with sisters8). Alice quite explicitly verbalizes her desire, saying “I wouldn’t mind being a 
Pawn…though of course I should like to be a Queen, best,” and the Red Queen promises her a 
future in which “we shall all be Queens together, and it’s all feasting and fun!” (126, 128). 
-  Is being a queen all feasting and fun in Looking-Glass world, which is, of course, nothing 
more or less than Alice’s own mind?9  One thing we might note is that queens are rather more 
powerful than kings in this world, just as they are in chess. In rushing to the aid of her child, the 
White Queen, so often depicted as hopelessly helpless (or helplessly hopeless) “rushe[s] past the 
King so violently that she knock[s] him over among the cinders” (113). The king is unhappy but 
ineffective about the matter. The Red King lies napping while the Red Queen tromps around 
bossing all and sundry, and Alice herself is kingless, an unattached queen with a decidedly 
arrogant swagger in Tenniel’s illustration of her demanding entrance to her palace. In describing 
                                                 
8  Given that she must mother the White Queen and take direction from the Red Queen, 
and is then squashed between them as notably illustrated by Tenniel, perhaps we should take this 
sisterhood as a representation of the three Liddell sisters, of whom Alice was the middle: Lorina, 
Alice, and Edith. 
9  The book raises the possibility that the Red King, rather than Alice, is the dreamer in this 
book, but while of course Alice the character is Carroll’s dreamchild, it is this very 
indeterminacy—is she dreamer or dreamed?—that helps to position Alice as a monster, neither 
one thing nor the other. 
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the Red Queen to Alice, the Rose tells her that “She’s one of the kind that has nine spikes, you 
know…all around her head, of course…I was wondering you hadn’t got some too. I thought it 
was the regular rule” (123). The rose is certainly suggesting that Alice should have her own 
crown. In a text by Carroll, that artist of wordplay, I would suggest that there may be a pun on 
“rule” to suggest that a queen’s rule, meaning “reign,” is the regular kind of rule. We can find the 
pun coming up again when the White Queen bemoans her lot, saying “I wish I could manage to 
be glad!...Only I never can remember the rule” (152). It seems that a happy queen is one who 
does not forget to exercise her authority. 
Alice’s own experience of queenhood is a bit conflicted. She is, as so many critics have 
already noted, dismayed by her crown which is “very heavy” and “fitted tight all round her 
head,” but under no circumstances does she reject or regret her new position. Indeed, when she 
first finds herself wearing the crown that has magically appeared on her head, she is careful lest 
“the crown…come off, but she comforted herself with the thought that there was nobody to see 
her ‘and if I really am a Queen,’ she said as she sat down again, ‘I shall be able to manage it 
quite well in time’” (192). We see that despite her initial dismay, Alice has no intention of losing 
her crown, literally and no doubt metonymically as well, and her confidence in herself and her 
own abilities is paramount—she knows that she shall be able to manage the crown quite well in 
the foreseeable future. In fact, as we can see from Tenniel’s illustration, Alice keeps the crown on 
her head even while losing her temper and destroying her unruly and frustrating coronation 
dinner.   And despite her inability to pass the Red and White Queens’ absurd exam, the Red 
Queen is forced to hail her as “Queen Alice” in her toast. 
Whatever the critics may think, and whatever Carroll’s wishes may be, Alice’s own desire 
for and confidence in her queenship never wavers. She never repudiates her ambitions, rejects 
Schanoes  Queen Alice and the Monstrous Child  
 
23 
her crown, or doubts her own authority. It is Carroll’s avatars—his narrator, his White Knight, 
his Gnat--who are sad and wistful for what has been lost in Alice’s maturation into queenhood, 
not Alice. Alice’s refusal to accede to Carroll’s desire that she stay a child is, Gubar suggests, 
essential in Carroll’s own view to her autonomy. She disagrees with the narrator and the author, 
and she is right to do so.  
Certainly the journey to queenhood is not without loss—Alice herself fears losing her 
name along the way, and she temporarily does so in the forest where things have no names. 
Interestingly enough, the name she is trying to recall begins, she thinks, with “L.”  “Alice,” of 
course, begins with “A.”  But “Liddell,” Alice’s surname, begins with “L,” and it is not at all 
unreasonable to assume that a girl growing into a woman in Victorian England will eventually 
lose her surname. Alice Liddell did in 1880, when she married and became Alice Hargreaves. 
Alice’s own concern about such a loss is not that she will lose her sense of self (unlike in 
Wonderland, Alice is quite secure in her identity in the Looking-Glass world), but that “they’d 
have to give me another, and it would be almost certain to be an ugly one. But then the fun 
would be, trying to find the creature that had got my old name!” (135). Of course, the creature 
that has Alice Liddell’s old name, inscribed in the acrostic with which Carroll ends Looking-
Glass, is the character Alice.    
In exchange for losing this name, Alice acquires authority. She seizes the pencil of the 
White King early in the novel, and despite his struggles writes what she wishes to communicate, 
criticizing the balancing skills of one of Carroll's self-insertions, the White Knight. She refuses to 
be the White Knight’s prisoner. And her final act in the Looking-Glass world is to lay hands on 
her most aggravating antagonist, the Red Queen. While her authority—and authorship—is called 
into question by the suggestion that the Red King is dreaming her into being, it is clear that after 
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she awakes, Alice does not take this notion seriously. While she bursts into tears during her 
dream when Tweedledee and Tweedledum first inform her that she is only a sort of thing in the 
Red King’s dream, she is positively light-hearted about the possibility at the end of the novel, 
putting the question to the black kitten, who considers licking its paw a far more enthralling 
consideration. The novel itself leaves the control in the hands of the child-reader, as it ends by 
asking “Which do you think it was?” (208). If the final answer does not lie with Alice, it can be 
found in another child—the child-reader whose opinion is sought in the narrative’s final word. 
It is Alice’s desires that differentiate Looking-Glass from Wonderland. Where 
Wonderland is driven by Alice’s mounting frustration and anger, Looking-Glass is a quest driven 
by Alice’s desires and goals. In the critical dismissal of Alice’s experiences and perspective, in 
the dismissal of those desires and the dismissal of Alice’s refusal to accept or defer to the 
narrator’s melancholy desire for her phantom childhood, I see not Carroll, but our own age’s 
prejudices and willingness to dismiss children’s desires, perspectives, and experiences. I see not 
Carroll, with his gentle respect for children’s sensibilities and astute understanding of their joys, 
but us, regular adults, with our easy ability to override children’s stated wishes, secure in the 
knowledge that we know what’s best for our children. Often we are right—my godson does need 
to go to sleep at seven in the evening no matter what he may think. But more often than we may 
like to think, Carroll tells us, we are wrong, particularly when we idealize childhood and 
children.  
 But what, then, about our child-monsters? Why have we created so many monstrous 
child-characters, the murderous children that have populated horror movies for over fifty years. 
They are no meek and mild innocents. What do they want from us with their murderous 
rampages? What are they asking us? Perhaps after all, what they want is no different from what 
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Carroll gave his Alice: a way out of the monstrosity that is our vision of childhood. It is not only 
in Looking-Glass land that innocence is coupled with monstrosity. 
 In “Baby Bitches from Hell: Monstrous Little Women in Film,” Barbara Creed finds a 
confluence in the innocence of the female child and her monstrosity in Surrealist thought as well: 
“The Surrealists idealized the female child as the femme-enfant, and endowed her with a special 
ability to enter the realm of the marvelous. Through her, they hoped to return to a state of lost 
innocence and capture again that special state of childhood wonderment at the mysteries and 
magic of life....A central feature of many films about the young girl is the way in which 
innocence and evil are interconnected; it is as if the girl's innocence opens the way for the 
entrance of evil, one feeding off the other in a complex relationship of interdependence” (34, 35-
36). Through this lens, monstrosity requires the innocence attributed to the female child in order 
to be fully realized, and that would be why Alice in Wonderland is not a monster—she is simply 
not innocent enough. We know, for instance, through her encounter with the pigeon, that she is 
interchangeable with a serpent. But in Looking-Glass land, Alice is comparatively kind and 
mild—in other words, innocent enough to become a monster. 
 Karen Coats argues that despite—or, given the foregoing, because of—the prevailing 
ideology of childhood innocence—the Victoran era is also characterized by an “outright hatred of 
otherness,” an otherness that includes children and childhood (4). She focuses her attention on 
the figure of Barrie's Peter Pan, locating in him a heartlessness and jouissance that enrages adults 
who have had to sacrifice such anti-social qualities in order to pursue and maintain peaceful 
domesticity. Interestingly, she describes Hook's hatred for Pan thus: “What irritates Hook so 
much is that Peter does not know anything about form, good or bad, which is part of the social 
substitution we make when we choose society over isolation, particularly in Victorian 
Schanoes  Queen Alice and the Monstrous Child  
 
26 
[culture]...Peter only knows how to exercise his joy” (20). It is Peter's innocence that draws 
Hook's hatred, that makes him into a monster from the point of view of Hook, the adult 
antagonist. This hatred, she has previously noted, relies on “mak[ing] the figure of the child into 
an object and enter[ing] into a relation of unequal power with regard to his or her subjectivity. 
That is, instead of engaging children at the level of subject to subject, we must enter into a 
relationship with them in terms of subject (us) and object (them). This requires a distancing, a 
sense of oneself as other than a child, that is, an adult" (7). Having been deemed innocent and 
transformed into an object, Alice is both less and more than fully human—a monster. And in our 
society’s objectification of children and sanctification of innocence, we have created the space 
for the child-monsters that populate our movie screens. 
 The only escape from to the monstrosity that is our vision of childhood innocence is to 
become a queen, to grow up. If Alice the child always already contains monstrosity within her, as 
I have argued in this paper, the entry into adulthood, far from being corruption, is what allows 
the child to escape monstrosity. Our nostalgic projection is wrong, and the children who wish to 
grow up are right, Through the Looking-Glass tells us, and an unnatural degree of innocence 
makes monsters.
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